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INTRODUCTION 
Arthur D. Little has been working with NASA for two years in an effort to 
assess the risks to the nation posed by the potential usage of carbon fiber com- 
posites in aviation. Last year at this time we presented the results of a Phase 
1 study which estimated the national risk through 1993 due to the potential use 
of carbon fiber composites in air carrier aircraft. Since then we have performed 
a number of modifications and revisions to that initial assessment, as shown in 
Figure 1. The Phase 2 enhancements included refinements in several areas: 
dispersion models, facility vulnerability analyses, CF release conditions, and 
risks due to CF usage in general aviation and in surface transportation vehicles. 
Our presentation is divided into two parts: I will speak on the risks for 
commercial aviation and Dr. Donald Rosenfield will then discuss our findings for 
general aviation. The risks due to surface transportation will be addressed by 
Drs. Hergenrother and Hathaway of the D0T.l 
COMMERCIAL AVIATION RISK ASSESSMENT 
The objectives of the commercial aviation risk assessment are shown in 
Figure 2. The ultimate objective was the assessment of national risk. To meet 
this objective, several related objectives were formulated. In order to quanti- 
fy the amount of carbon fiber that could be found on aircraft, we were required 
to project the potential usage of carbon fiber composites in commercial aircraft 
through 1993. In order to estimate the frequency with which such fibers could 
be released, we were required to investigate the incidence of commercial air- 
craft accidents with fire and explosion, in terms of both their location and 
frequency. In order to describe the physical mechanisms whereby fibers could 
be released and dispersed over the surrounding area, we had to develop disper- 
sion models. A related objective was to estimate the potential economic losses 
in situations where the accidentally released carbon fibers were able to pene- 
trate buildings and equipment cabinets, creating damaging short circuits. In 
addition, we were required to explicitly show the uncertainties in the assump- 
tions that entered into the risk analysis, and to test the sensitivity of the 
risk profile to those input parameters. 
The sequence of events that needed to be modeled in order to describe the 
phenomenon of carbon fiber risk is shown in Figure 3. Air carrier operations 
will occasionally result in accidental fires and/or explosions. If the aircraft 
183 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19800010924 2020-03-21T02:24:42+00:00Z
is carrying carbon fiber composites in the structure, then some of these fibers 
may be burned away by an intense fire, will rise in the convection plume and 
will be dispersed over a large area, depending upon the atmospheric conditions 
and the wind direction. If there are buildings or other facilities located in 
the path of the carbon fiber cloud, and if these buildings contain electronic 
equipment which is potentially vulnerable to the fibers, then there is a possi- 
bility that they will penetrate these buildings, damage the equipment and thus 
result in economic losses to the residents or proprietors of these facilities. 
We will separately address each of the steps involved in this sequence of events 
and show how we analyzed them. 
Carbon Fiber Usage 
In order to describe the usage of carbon fiber composites in aircraft, we 
divided the commercial aircraft into three categories of jets--small, medium 
and large jets. Each of the jet aircraft produced by the major airframe manu- 
facturers was assigned to one of these classes. We did not consider other 
classes of aircraft,such as turbo-props,since there is not expected to be a 
great deal of carbon fiber usage for these type of aircraft. The projections 
for carbon fiber usage in commercial aircraft are shown in Figure 4. These are 
based on estimates obtained from the three major U.S. airframe manufacturers, 
McDonnell Douglas, Lockheed and Boeing. They estimated both the fleet mix, 
that is the relative numbers of different sizes of aircraft in service in 1993, 
and the potential usage of carbon fiber composites for each of these classes. 
As indicated in Figure 4, roughly half of the aircraft in service in 1993 will 
be large jets, the majority of which will be using carbon fiber composites. The 
projected weight of actual carbon fibers, including the epoxy binding,ranges 
from only 11 kg. on some of the small aircraft to as much as 15 600 kg. on some 
of the large aircraft. For the purposes of the risk analysis we used these es- 
timated ranges to develop a probability distribution for the amount of carbon 
fiber involved in an aircraft accident. 
To characterize air carrier activity within the U.S. as a whole, we focused 
upon the 26 large hub airports which account for approximately 70% of domestic 
passenger enplanements. As shown in Figure 5, the balance of the passenger 
traffic in the U.S. is accounted for by 40 medium hub airports and a large num- 
ber of small hub airports. Only about 3% of total commercial passenger enplane- 
ments occur at airports other than these hub airports designated by the F.A.A. 
Our approach was to study in detail the traffic patterns and the exposed popu- 
lation in the vicinity of the 26 large hubs and then to extrapolate the result- 
ing risk estimates to the rest of the nation. 
Accident Conditions 
The typical conditions surrounding a severe fire and/or explosion in the 
case of an air carrier accident were investigated through use of the National 
Transportation Safety Board accident and incident statistics for the years 1968- 
1976. Using their records, we created a data base of aircraft accidents that 
listed for each accident the phase of operation, the location of the accident, 
the weather conditions at the time of the accident, the nature of the fire, and 
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other relevant details. This data base was augmented with the help of the air- 
frame manufacturers who provided additional data on accident characteristics, 
such as fire duration, that would affect carbon fiber release conditions. We 
then utilized these data to determine the distribution of possible accident char- 
acteristics. We found that almost half of the severe accidents involving fire 
occurred during the landing phase. As shown in Figure 6, the take-off phase ac- 
counts for one-quarter of these accidents, with the remainder being distributed 
in either the static/taxi or cruise phase. Cruise accidents were dealt with 
through a separate analysis since the location of these accidents is essentially 
random. However, the static, take-off or landing accidents were all associated 
with specific airport locations. 
From an analysis of the location of accidents relative to airport runways, 
we found that over 80% of accidents occur within 10 kilometers of the airport, 
and in fact 60% of accidents occur at the airport. We also investigated the 
angle between the accident location and the line of the runway to establish more 
precisely the potential locations of such accidents. 
Historically, there have been about 3.8 accidents per year involving jet 
air carriers. Alt:hough air carrier operations are gradually.increasing in num- 
ber, the accident frequency appears to be relatively constant from year to year. 
Therefore, we did not project any increase in accidents through 1993. Based on 
the expected fraction of the air carrier fleet that would be carrying carbon 
fiber in 1993, the projected frequency of incidents involving fire on aircraft 
carrying composites of carbon fibers would be approximately 2.7 per year in 1993. 
Release and Dispersion 
There are two different types of scenarios that describe possible carbon 
fiber release situations in the aftermath of an air carrier incident. One of 
them is a simple fire plume in which the fibers are carried aloft by the plume 
and then dispersed. The second is the fire and explosion case in which there is 
a sudden rapid conflagration of fuel resembling an explosion, in which much 
more rapid burning of composite and a sudden release of fibers can take place 
over a short period of time. Based on the 92 accident data base compiled by the 
airframe manufacturers, we estimated conservatively that at most 5% of air car- 
rier accidents would result in explosive release of carbon fibers of the type 
described. 
The two dispersion models corresponding to the two accident and carbon fi- 
ber release scenarios are shown graphically in Figure 7. In the fire and explo- 
sion case, we consider only those accidents in which there was a delayed explo- 
sion preceded by a period of burn during which the epoxy or resin surrounding 
the fibers would be burned away. This would expose the carbon fibers to an 
agitation by the force of the conflagration and thus would hypothetically result 
in a larger number of single fibers released. This scenario was modeled as an 
instantaneous release in the form of a cloud at a height of 10 meters above the 
site of the accident. In the fire plume model, rather than having an instanta- 
neous release,we have a continuous release of fibers over the period that the 
aircraft burns. The carbon fiber plume rises until it meets the inversion layer 
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and then is tilted or reflected back toward the ground. The direction and 
velocity of the wind determine the exposure contour over which carbon fibers 
will be deposited. 
The extent of dispersion of carbon fibers from a burning aircraft and the 
level of resulting exposures to the surrounding area are greatly influenced by 
the release conditions at the time of the accident. Release conditions include 
the weather conditions, such as atmospheric stability class, wind velocity and 
wind direction. These were examined at each of the 26 major airports with the 
help of NOAA statistics. However, it was more difficult to estimate the release 
conditions associated with the duration and the intensity of the fire. With the 
help of the 92 accident data base compiled by the airframe manufacturers we were 
able to develop distributions for several of the important release variables, as 
shown in Figure 8. These included the time of burn--that is, the duration over 
which the fire lasted, the percent of fuel burned,and the percent of carbon fi-. 
ber involved. Our approach to estimating CF involvement is described below. 
The degree of carbon fiber involvement was correlated with both the duration of 
the fire and the percent of fuel burned. Roughly speaking, the greater the 
amount of fuel burned, the longer the duration of the burn, and the greater the 
potential carbon fiber involvement. In addition, the amount of fuel on board 
was estimated for different phases of operation and different aircraft size cate- 
gories, and the amount of carbon fibers on board was estimated for the three 
size classes of aircraft. This allowed calculation of the actual amount of fuel 
burned and the actual amount of carbon fiber involved. 
Even though an aircraft may be carrying over 15 000 kg. of CF composite, 
the amount of carbon fibers that could be released in a fire is significantly 
less, partly because of the fact that not all the carbon fibers can be released 
as single fibers in a burn, and partly because the entire aircraft structure 
will not necessarily be involved in the fire. 
Based on experimental findings, which were described by Dr. Vernon Be11,'it 
is estimated that not more than 1% of the carbon fibers would be released in 
most fire plumes, and that not more than 2.5% would be released in most fire and 
explosion scenarios. These are conservative estimates using the best judgment 
and interpretation of the experiments conducted by NASA and other groups on 
burning composite materials. 
To examine structure involvement, we used the results of an analysis by 
the airframe manufacturers, who estimated the amount of structure that could be 
involved in a fire for various components of their aircraft. Using the data 
base of 92 fire incidents, they estimated the percent of each component that was 
involved in the fire, thus creating a distribution of potential structural in- 
volvement. As shown in Figure 9, we combined the structural damage estimates 
with the projected usage of carbon fibers by component (also developed by the 
airframe manufacturers) to produce estimates of the potential carbon fiber in- 
volvement in air carrier fires. The range of involvement varied from zero, 
reflecting a fire which did not damage any of the structure containing carbon 
fibers, to 100% involvement in which all portions of the aircraft containing 
CF were completely involved in the fire. Our median estimates of carbon fiber 
involvement were 45% for small jets, 69% for medium jets, and 64% for large 
jets. This variation is due largely to the different levels of CF usage in the 
different aircraft size classes. 
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Exposure Contours and Demographics 
A simplified illustration of'exposure contours is shown in Figure 10. Note 
that the aircraft runway here has not been drawn to scale. Assuming that an 
Iincident is located at some distance from.the runway, the carbon fiber cloud 
will move in the direction of the wind and may travel for distances of as much 
as 80 kilometers. The exposure is a measure of concentration over time, and as 
we move farther from the incident location, the exposures to carbon fibers will 
tend to decrease. Figure10 shows three exposure contours corresponding to expo- 
sures of 105, 104, and lo3 fiber-sec./m3. In our simulation approach we 
applied the appropriate dispersion model to each simulated accident and calcu- 
lated the resulting exposures at various points surrounding the incident loca- 
tion. The physical mechanisms underlying carbon fiber dispersion have been 
described thoroughly by Dr. Wolf Elber.3 
In order to assess the potential damage due to such a release, we performed 
a demographic and facility analysis for each of the 26 major airports. Upon 
each of these airports we superimposed a circular grid as shown in Figure 11, 
which divided the area surrounding the airport into 40 geographic sectors of 
varying sizes. The edge of the outside sectors was 80 kilometers from the air- 
port center. Using the results of the selected dispersion model for each simu- 
lated accident, we calculated an exposure distribution within each of these 
sectors. That is, we estimated the proportion of each sector that experienced 
an exposure of lo*, log, etc. We also enumerated the facilities, residences 
and other structures containing potentially vulnerable electronic equipment with- 
in each of these sectors, using census data and other sources. The categories 
of vulnerable facilities that were considered are shown in Figure 12. They 
included households, or private residences; manufacturers of electronic equipment, 
computers and aerospace equipment, as well as manufacturers of non-electronic 
equipment whose production control systems might be vulnerable; transportation, 
including aircraft and air traffic controls, mass transit,and railways; communi- 
cation facilities including telephone, radio, TV and micro-wave installations, and 
post offices, in particular the optical character reading equipment; and fire 
and police communications. In terms of business services, we included in our 
enumeration financial and insurance services, software and electronic data pro- 
cessing services, as well as hospitals. We also enumerated retail outlets and 
office buildings, which could contain varying amounts of electronic equipment. 
Because of the widespread use of electronics in contemporary society, and because 
of the tremendous growth rate envisioned for electronics in 1993, it was neces- 
sary in this risk analysis to consider almost every category of private or pub- 
lic building as being potentially vulnerable. We examined the properties of 
such buildings in terms of penetration, ventilation and filtration and concluded 
that some of them were not very vulnerable, for example, hospitals. The results 
of our facility site visits and vulnerability analysis have been presented by 
Ansel Butterfield.4 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
I have described the various elements of our analysis which provide 
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the necessary inputs for a Monte Carlo simulation. These data inputs included 
the accident characteristics, the release conditions, the dispersion model, and 
the characteristics of vulnerable facilities. Once these elements had been 
assembled, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation of potential aircraft accidents 
at each of the 26 large hub airports. We used the Monte Carlo method to develop 
an individual risk profile for each airport,and then these risk profiles were 
combined into a national risk profile. (A risk profile is a graph indicating 
the probability of exceeding various levels of dollar loss.) Figure 13 shows 
the Monte Carlo procedure for an individual airport. Each point at which a 
question mark is shown denotes a random draw from an input distribution. These 
distributions were developed through the analyses discussed previously. 
The Monte Carlo procedure works in the following manner: It simulates a 
large number of accidents, on the order of hundreds or thousands of accidents, 
and for each one draws from probability distributions a set of conditions for 
that accident. By repeating the simulation many times, we show the full range 
of possible accident types and thus develop a distribution of the potential 
accident results. As shown in Figure 13, the aircraft and incident details, 
such as the size of the plane and the phase of the operation,are randomly drawn, 
and these in turn influence the probable accident location, the likelihood of a 
delayed explosion, and the assumed release conditions. 
If an explosion does occur, which happens about 5% of the time, then the 
fire and explosion model is selected, whereas if it does not occur, the fire 
plume model is selected to compute exposures. The weather conditions such as 
stability class and wind velocity are drawn from weather distributions for the 
particular airport in question,and these together with the release conditions 
determine the exposures resulting from the dispersion model. These exposures 
are then calculated at a large number of points within the 40-sector grid and an 
exposure distribution is found for each sector. From this exposure distribution 
we use the penetration and vulnerability characteristics of the facilities ex- 
posed, and an economic analysis model which estimates the economic losses result- 
ing for each affected facility. The losses are then summed to determine the 
total economic losses resulting from the simulated accident. Once this is com- 
plete, the computer returns and simulates another accident, drawing a new set of 
aircraft/incident details. This procedure was repeated iteratively until enough 
samples had been taken to get a reasonably accurate distribution of the economic 
losses resulting from an accident. In this way we developed 26 individual risk 
profiles for the large hub airports. 
An example of the outcome of a typical computer simulation is shown in 
Figure 14. In this case, the computer generated a hypothetical accident at La 
Guardia airport, relatively close to the center of a runway. The aircraft in- 
volved was a medium jet in a static or taxi phase, which somehow caught fire. 
About 8500 kg. of fuel were burned over a period of more than thirty minutes, 
releasing 22 kg. of carbon fibers. There was also a delayed explosion during 
the burn. Based upon the randomly drawn weather conditions, the CF cloud moved 
westward, toward New York City, creating exposures as high as lOa fiber-seconds 
per cubic meter at the airport, and lo7 fiber-sec./m3 within 3 km. of the air- 
port. The resulting losses due to equipment failures amounted to a total of 
$178, of which households accounted for $66. By performing hundreds of itera- 
tions like this one, the computer generated a risk profile for La Guardia air- 
port. 
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The next task was to derive the national risk profile. This was done by 
combining the individual risk profiles with information concerning potential 
losses due to cruise accidents and accidents at airports other than the 26 
considered. 
Risk Profile Development 
We developed two kinds of national risk profiles in this analysis. One of 
them was the risk profile for a single incident, which gave the distribution of 
dollar losses resulting from any one air carrier accident. This was derived by 
taking a weighted mixture of the individual airport risk profiles for a single 
incident, weighted by the frequency of incidents at each airport. This proced- 
ure is shown in Figure 15. The second type of national risk profile derived was 
the national annual risk profile which showed the distribution of total losses 
due to accidents involving carbon fibers. This annual risk profile incorporates 
the possibility of one, two, three or more accidents involving carbon fiber re- 
lease during any given year. To derive the annual risk profile we used the 
national risk profile for a single incident and performed a convolution proced- 
ure based on the annual frequency of such accidents. 
Before proceeding to the results of the risk analysis, it is important to 
note the major assumptions that entered into this analysis. The most important 
assumptions are listed in Figure 16. First, atmospheric conditions are assumed 
to remain constant during the dispersion of the carbon fiber cloud. This is a 
somewhat unrealistic assumption since weather conditions are constantly changing, 
and a cloud moving at a rate of a few kilometers per hour could take as much as 
a day to cover 80 kilometers. However, it would be too complex to simulate dif- 
ferent atmospheric conditions in different geographic sectors, and therefore 
this assumption was made. The assumption is not expected to introduce any bias 
into the risk analysis since the variation of atmospheric conditions will some- 
times increase and sometimes decrease the resulting exposures. We also assumed 
that there was no precipitation, which is a conservative assumption since if pre- 
cipitation does occur it may wash out some of the fibers, resulting in lower 
airborne exposures on the ground. It was found that there was a high likelihood 
of rain or other forms of precipitation being associated with an aircraft acci- 
dent, since many of the accidents in the historical data base occurred in IFR, 
or instrument flight rules weather. The second major assumption is that for a 
given facility category all facilities are equal in size, equipment inventory, 
and financial characteristics. Again this is a necessary assumption due to the 
enormous volume of data that would have to be processed in order to identify all 
the different sizes or scales of facilities that do exist. Instead, we took the 
average case, based upon regional statistics for each facility category, and at- 
tempted to model the typical vulnerable facility. The variation in facility 
characteristics would introduce a little more variation into the risk profile 
but should not affect the results too greatly because of the large number of 
facilities involved that would tend to average each other out. The third major 
assumption is that all equipment is activated and that failures occur immediately 
after exposure. This assumes, first of all,that equipment which is exposed is in 
an activated state and is vulnerable to the fibers at the time of exposure. 
Since some fraction of the eletronic equipment exposed will not be activated, 
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this tends to be a conservative assumption. On,the other hand, there is a phen- 
omenon of post-exposure vulnerability, in which fibers that are deposited upon 
equipment do not cause a problem immediately but will affect the equipment when 
it is turned on at a later date. This phenomenon was not modeled explicitly, 
but it is taken into account by assuming continuous activation and failures im- 
mediately after exposure. 
The annual risk profile for economic losses due to air carrier fires in- 
volving carbon fibers is shown in Figure 17. The horizontal axis shows the 
total economic losses in dollars as a result of carbon fiber accidents during a 
given year. The vertical axis shows the annual probability of exceeding each 
dollar loss value. For example, an annual loss of approximately one thousand 
dollars would be exceeded with a probability of 10-l, in other words once every 
ten years. An annual loss of ten thousand dollars would be exceeded about once 
every three hundred years. The expected annual losses due to CF released from 
air carrier fires in 1993 is about $470. This includes only those losses in- 
curred by failures of equipment in the civilian sector. 
Discussion of Results 
The confidence bounds on the risk profile show the sensitivity of the risk 
estimates to variations in the input parameters. These confidence bounds are 
based upon several different sources of uncertainty: the statistical error due 
to the simulation method, the statistical error in estimation of accident fre- 
quency , and the modeling errors due to uncertainty about input parameters. The 
former two sources of uncertainty were judged to contribute less than an order 
of magnitude to the confidence bound at the high-loss extreme, and considerably 
less than that at average loss values. The confidence bounds are wider at high 
loss values because the simulation may not turn up an extremely unlikely high- 
loss event even among thousands of simulated events. 
To estimate the modeling errors, we performed a sensitivity analysis by 
varying several of the key input parameters. The results are shown in Figure 18. 
This analysis was run on the individual airport risk profile which had the high- 
est mean loss of the 26 hubs, namely Detroit. Of the three parameters tested, 
the largest increase in risk was obtained by setting the composite on the air- 
craft at its highest possible value, 15.652 kg. This increased the mean loss 
per incident by a factor of about 7, and increased the standard deviation and 
maximum value of the losses by a factor of about 4.5. Restricting the simula- 
tion model to only explosive releases increased these statistics by a factor of 
2 or 3, while setting the atmospheric stability class to E (moderately stable 
weather) increased the loss distribution only slightly. The two latter condi- 
tions are those which tend to result in highest exposures downwind of the release 
point. We concluded that modeling errors contributed less than an order of 
magnitude to the uncertainty of the risk profile. 
As a final verification of the simulation results, we compared the national 
conditional profile for dollar losses per incident against a risk profile ob- 
tained through an alternative analytic approach. The latter approach, which is 
based upon a Poisson model of equipment failures, will be described by Dr. 
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Rosenfield in the context of the general aviation risk assessment. As shown in 
Figure 19, the two methods agreed fairly well, with their mean values differing 
by a factor of less than 3. The simulation indicated an average loss of $172 
per incident, while the Poisson method resulted in an average loss of $472 per 
incident. 
GENERAL AVIATION RISK ASSESSMENT 
This section reports on the investigation of the effects of carbon fiber 
usage in general aviation aircraft. The objective of this analysis was to as- 
sess the national risk through 1993 in terms of economic losses and to deter- 
mine the sensitivity of the risk assessment to uncertainties in the input data. 
In formulating this objective, we identified as sub-objectives the projection 
of potential usage of carbon fiber composites in general aviation aircraft 
through 1993 and the investigation of fire accidents in general aviation with- 
in the U.S. The risk assessment thus involved forecasting future carbon fiber 
usage, development of an accident model for general aviation aircraft, analysis 
of the possible release amounts in general aviation accidents, and assessment of 
the economic consequences of a given release. These objectives are summarized 
in Figure 20. 
Methodology Overview 
The methodology utilized for the general aviation risk assessment was 
quite different from that utilized for commercial aviation. The major issues 
involved in selecting a methodology are summarized in Figure 21. The simula- 
tion model is more appropriate for large releases which will result in large 
numbers of failures, and allows detailed identification of the geographic dis- 
tribution of facilities as well as of the different possible accident and 
release conditions. As noted previously, the simulation approach results in 
statistical uncertainty at the high-loss tail of the risk profile. In the case 
of general aviation, the number of failures per incident was expected to be ex- 
tremely small, and the dominant variation in economic losses appeared to be 
caused by the random failure process rather than by the variations in physical 
conditions. Furthermore, there were insufficient data available to allow a 
detailed modeling of release and dispersion scenarios. 
For these reasons, an analytic methodology was developed to synthesize 
the accident model and carbon fiber usage forecast for assessment of the eco- 
nomic consequences of accidents. This methodology is shown in Figure 22. There 
were two key parameters influencing the economic consequences of accidents. The 
first was the amount of fibers released in an accident. By examining the dif- 
ferent types of general aviation aircraft and their accident statistics, a 
distribution of amounts of carbon fibers potentially released in accidents was 
developed. The second key parameter was the density of facilities near the 
location of an accident. Thus, an important aspect of the accident model was 
a quantitative description of the distribution of facility densities. The 
3,000 counties in the United States were chosen as a basis for estimating 
facility density, and hence a methodology was developed to apportion accidents 
191 
to the various counties. After a range of county and release amounts was de- 
veloped, the distribution of failures given an aviation accident was determined. 
A Poisson probability model was developed for this purpose and a computer pro- 
gram was utilized to tabulate failure probabilities as a function of the amount 
released and the county, and to aggregate these into a national risk profile of 
dollar losses. Based on the distribution of the number of equipment failures 
per accident, the statistics of dollar losses per accident, and the number of 
accidents per year, expressions were developed for the mean and standard devia- 
tion of a dollar loss per year. From these statistics, approximations and 
bounds were developed for the probability distribution of annual economic losses. 
Before examining the details of this methodology it is important to under- 
stand the theoretical basis of the Poisson approach, as depicted in Figure 23. 
For a given release scenario and equipment type, the number of equipment fail- 
ures may be approximated by a Poisson distribution with mean No. The mean 
number of failures is given by integrating the equipment density over the area 
in question and multiplying by the equipment failure probability, which is 
nearly linear in E for low values of the exposure E. Now, provided the amount 
released is held constant, we can aggregate over many release scenarios, and 
show that the average No is proportional to the surface integral S of the expo- 
sure, which in turn may be shown to depend only on the amount released. Thus 
an expression is obtained for the mean number of failures per incident in terms 
of just the average facility density, the amount of CF released, and the equip- 
ment vulnerability. This enables us to assess the risk without requiring de- 
tailed data on accident conditions or geographic locations. 
Steps in Risk Analysis 
The first step in the risk assessment procedure was the development of a 
forecast of the usage of carbon fibers in general aviation aircraft and deter- 
mination of the potential amounts released in accidents. Figure 24 presents a 
table summarizing our projections. For the purposes of this analysis, we iden- 
tified three classes of general aviation aircraft. These were: single-reci- 
procating-engine craft; multi-engine and jet aircraft; and helicopters, non- 
fixed wing and non-powered craft. Of the latter category, helicopters represent 
nearly all of the accidents historically. The annual growth rates for the 
number of aircraft in each of these categories are 6.3%, 4.8%, and 8.6%, 
respectively. Thus, the number of craft in 1993 will be 321,000; 72,500; 25,000; 
respectively. It is estimated that about 25% of the general aviation fleet will 
be carrying carbon fiber composites in 1993. Of these craft, helicopters will 
be using the largest amount of carbon fiber composites, about 54.5 kilograms, 
and the other classes of aircraft will be using substantially less than this. 
In a fire accident, any release up to 2% of the weight of the composite is 
possible. Based on NASA estimates, a one-half percent release was assumed for 
the case of substantial damage. Thus, the maximum conceivable carbon fiber 
release in a general aviation accident is about 1.1 kilograms. 
The accident model addressed three issues: 
l An allocation of accidents to the 3,000 counties in the nation 
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l A determination of the number of fire accidents per year 
l A determination of the conditional scenario probabilities. 
A scenario consisted of an aircraft type, damage level, and 
type of accident (cruise or on airport). 
As shown in Figure 25, accidents taking place on or near airport were allocated 
to the various counties on the basis of total operations. Cruise accidents 
were estimated to be proportional to the general aviation miles or hours flown 
in a given county. In determining probabilities based on these criteria, there 
were two problems encountered. The first problem was that only 30% of general 
aviation operations could be attributed to given counties, based on FAA statis- 
tics. The remaining operations were allocated to the counties in each state 
according to population. The second problem was that there were no data availa- 
ble on air mileage or flight hours within each county. Air hours were estimated 
for each county by taking a weighted average of the local and itinerant opera- 
tions attributable to that county. Weighting factors were based on the average 
length of time of itinerant and local operations. There was an implicit assump- 
tion that each operation takes place wholly within the county or counties cor- 
responding to the operation's origin and destination. 
The accident probability estimates used in the risk assessment are shown in 
Figure 26. According to the National Transportation Safety Board accident 
statistics from 1968 to 1976, there are approximately 340 general aviation fire 
accidents per year. Although the number of operations is increasing, the acci- 
dent rate is decreasing and the number of accidents per year has remained approx- 
:imately constant. On this basis we assumed that there will be about 340 general 
aviation fire accidents in 1993. Of these, based on a 25% incidence of carbon 
fiber composites in the general aviation fleet, we estimate that there will be 
85 fire accidents for carbon fiber-carrying general aviation aircraft in 1993. 
Air taxi and commuter operations would raise this to 88 accidents in 1993. This 
figure was used in the subsequent analysis. 
Figure 26 also presents the conditional probabilities of different accident 
types given that an accident occurs. These scenario probabilities are based on 
the 3058 accidents that occurred from 1968 to 1976. They represent the relative 
frequencies of aircraft and accident categories adjusted to account for the 
growth rates of different aircraft classes. Thus, for example, because the 
helicopter category is characterized by a higher growth rate, the scenario prob- 
abilities for helicopter accidents are slightly higher than the relative frequency 
of helicopter accidents from 1968 through 1976. 
After having determined the county and release amount probabilities, we 
used a computer program to tabulate the probability distribution of the number 
of failures per accident. The basis of the program was the Poisson model for 
the number of failures given a density of facilities and amounts released. For 
general aviation accidents the expected number of failures per accident is sub- 
stantially less than one as shown by the distribution in Figure 27. The average 
value is 0.022 although the average would be larger for certain combinations of 
county and release amount. For this order of magnitude nearly all of the varia- 
tion in number of failures per accident is due to the random nature of failures, 
rather than the release conditions such as wind direction and fire intensity. 
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As mentioned earlier, the expected number of equipment failures is thus propor- 
tional to the density of facilities and the amount of carbon fibers released, 
and inversely proportional to the mean outside exposure to failure for each 
equipment class. Furthermore, the number of failures can be described by a 
Poisson probability distribution with the parameter equal to the expectation. 
The important aspect of the Poisson model is that it eliminates the need for 
analysis of release conditions other than total amounts released. 
Risk Profile Generation 
Because of the large number of equipment categories, counties, and amounts 
released, a computer program was necessary to tabulate the various parameters 
of the Poisson distributions. The procedural flow of the computer program is 
depicted in Figure 28. For each combination of amount of carbon fibers re- 
leased and county location, an expectation is determined together with a proba- 
bility distribution based on this expectation. From the county location 
probabilities and the amount released probabilities a national conditional dis- 
tribution can be developed for the number of failures given an accident. Based 
on the statistics of economic losses for each given equipment category, the 
relative Poisson parameters for the various equipment categories, and an annual 
accident frequency, the mean and standard deviation of dollar loss were computed 
for a single accident and for total annual loss. We found that for general 
aviation accidents the mean annual loss was estimated to be $253, as shown in 
Figure 29. The standard deviation was $1067. 
For losses near the mean value a normal distribution is a reasonable approx- 
imation. For high dollar losses, however, it is necessary to develop statisti- 
cal upper bounds based on the mean and standard deviation of annual loss. From 
standard statistical results, it is known that the probability of a random event 
exceeding a given number of standard deviations above the mean is inversely 
proportional to the square of that number of standard deviations. Thus, for 
example, the probability of a random event exceeding 100 standard deviations 
above the mean is no more than l/loo2 or 10m4. Based on this inequality, we 
developed the upper bounds on the distribution for annual dollar loss given in 
Figure 29. Using these bounds and a normal approximation near the center of 
the distribution, the risk profile depicted in Figure 30 was developed. It 
can be seen that the chances of exceeding losses of about $1 million are less 
than 10B6, or once every million years. 
Discussion of Results 
From this analysis we may conclude that it is highly unlikely that there 
can be a substantial dollar loss due to carbon fiber releases in general avia- 
tion accidents. To check the result, the sensitivity of the annual risk was 
analyzed with respect to uncertainties in the input data, as shown in Figure 31. 
If amounts released have been underestimated by a given factor or equipment 
vulnerabilities have been overestimated by a given factor, then there is a di- 
rect proportional effect on the probability factors for the annual loss 
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distribution. That is, the probabilities are increased by the same factor. 
As an example, if the carbon fiber releases go up by a factor of 10 or the 
vulnerability decreases by a factor of 10 the probabilities also go up by a 
factor of 10. Thus, the probability of exceeding 1 million dollars in losses 
in a given year goes from 10D6 to 10v5. Such changes still represent low 
probabilities of substantial losses.' 
In conclusion, it appears that. the expected annual risks to the U.S. due 
to the potential use of carbon fiber composites through 1993 are less than a 
thousand dollars per year, and that the chances of national losses reaching 
significant levels are extremely small. However, it should be noted that this 
risk assessment has addressed only dollar losses due to equipment failure in 
the civilian sector, and does not quantify other categories of risk such as 
costs of protection or cleanup of equipment, CF releases from non-aviation 
sources such as incineration of sporting goods, possible environmental damage 
by carbon fibers, or impacts upon military operations. 
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l Refinement of dispersion models to provide more accurate 
exposure estimates 
l Detailed field visits and vulnerability analyses for specific 
facility categories 
l Development of more accurate estimates for aircraft structural 
damage and CF release conditions 
l Incorporation of improved forecasts to 1993 jet aircraft fleet 
mix and carbon fiber usage 
l Improvement of confidence in risk profile through detailed 
sensitivity analyses and the development of an alternate 
methodology 
l Extension of risk analysis to include CF usage in 
- General aviation 
- Surface transportation vehicles 
Figure l.- Phase 2 enhancement to carbon fiber risk assessment. 
MAJOR OBJECTIVE: 
l Develop a national risk profile for total annual losses due to 
CF usage through 1993 
SUB-OBJECTIVES: 
l Project potential usage of CF composites through 1993 
l Investigate incidence of commercial aircraft fires within the U.S. 
l Model the potential release and dispersion of carbon fibers 
from a fire 
l Estimate potential economic losses due to CF damaging electronic 
equipment 
l Show explicitly uncertainties and assumptions in the risk assessment 
l Examine sensitivity of the risk profile to changes in the input 
parameters 


























Figure 3.- Sequence of events to be modelled. 
Size of Jet 
Small Medium Large TbTAL I- 
Number of Aircraft in Service 560 780 1399 2739 
Number of Aircraft Using CF 
Composites 
100 754 1127 1981 
Composite Mass per Aircraft (KG): 
Min. 11 215 155 
Max. 183 3787 15,652 
Figure 4.- Projected 1993 usage of carbon fiber composites 





Percent of Passenger Enplanements 
Figure 5.- Distribution of air carrier 
enplanements (source: 1977 airport 
activity statistics - FAA, CAB). 




0 Location relative to runway: At Airport 61% 
Within 1 KM 67% 
Within 10 KM 83% 
l Historical Frequency: 3.8 per Year 
Projected Frequency of 
Incidents in 1993 
Involving CF: 2.7 per year 
Figure 6.- Domestic air carrier incidents with 
severe fire and/or explosion (source: NTSB 
accident/incident statistics, 1968-1976). 
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Inversion Layer -_------------ 
I------\ 
/ \ 
1. Fire followed by a delayed explosion 
(instantaneous release model) 
2. Fire Plume Model 
Figure 7.- Dispersion models. 
l From 92 accident data base: 
Time of burn 
\ 
Correlated 
Percent of fuel burned 
Percent of CF involved I 
variables 
l Amount of fuel on board ‘\ Depend on phase 
Amount of CF on board f and size category 
l Type of release: Fire plume 95% 
Fire and explosion 5% 
l Percent of burning CF 
Released as single fibers: Fire plume 1% 
Fire and explosion 24% 
Figure 8.- Assumed release conditions for 











Median Estimates of CF 
Involvement: - Small Jets 
- Medium Jets 
- Large Jets 




Figure 9.- Potential carbon fiber 
involvement in air carrier 








Figure lO.- Exposure footprints after 
carbon fiber release. 
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Figure ll.- Distribution of sectors around 







- Electronic Equipment 
- Computers 
- Aerospace 
- Aircraft and Air Traffic Control 









- Retail Outlets 
-Office Buildings 
- Industrial Plants 
Figure 12.- Potentially vulnerable facilities. 
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EXPOSURE 4 ______ EXPOSURE 
BY SECTOR VALUES 
VULNERABLE 
I FACILITY 
Figure 13.- Monte Carlo simulation procedure. 
(A "?" denotes a randan draw.) 
// 
FLUSHING 
ACCIDENT CONDlTlONS RELEASE CONDITIONS 
Medium Jet Fuel Burned .847O kg 
StaticfTaxi Phase Time of Burn 33.5 min. 
Explosive Release CF released 22 kg 
WEATHER CONDITIONS CONSEQUENCES 
Neutral Atmor~here IDI 108 Exposureat Airport 
Wind from Em at 7 mlrec 10’ Exposure within 3 km of Airport 
Temperat”re: 1oc Total Dollar Loses 5178 
Ho”rehdd LOS525 566 










Figure l5.- Derivation of national 
risk profile. 
1. Atmospheric conditions remain constant during 
.dispersion of the carbon fiber cloud, and there 
is no precipitation 
2. For a given facility category, all facilities are 
equal in size, equipment inventory, and financial 
characteristics 
3. All equipments are in an activated state, and 
failures occur immediately after exposure 
Figure 16.- Major assumptions. 
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10' 102 103 104 16 
Total Losses13 IDollars) 
Figure 17.- National annual risk profile for 
carbon fiber releases from coimnercial air 
carriers (1993 CF utilization). 
Changes in risk profile due to variation of input parameters, tested for the 
airport with highest mean dollar loss 








(no plume release) 
Stability 





t by 7 


















t by 1.1 
Figure 18.- Sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 19.- Air carriers 1993 national conditional 
risk profile. 
MAJOR OBJECTIVE 
l Assess national risk of economic losses due to CF use 
in general aviation through 1993 
SUB-OBJECTIVES 
l Project potential usage of CF composites through 1993 
l Investigate incidence of fires in general aviation aircraft 
within the U.S. 
l Develop methods for assessing geographic distribution 
of potential economic losses 
l Determine sensitivity of risk profile to uncertainties in 
input data 
Figure 20.- General aviation risk assessment. 
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SIMULATION MODEL 
l Appropriate for large releases near metropolitan 
areas 
l Emphasizes variations in facility locations and 
release conditions 
l Estimates of high loss probabilities subject to 
statistical uncertainty 
ANALYTIC MODEL 
l Appropriate when number of failures per release 
is small 
l Emphasizes variation due to random nature of 
failure events 
l Addresses variations in facility density between 
counties 
‘0 Requires only data on amount of CF released, 
similar to “single-fiber” concept 
Figure 21.- Issues in choice of methodology. 
l Estimate distribution of CF released in general aviation accidents 
l Apportion accident locations by county based on air traffic activity 
l Develop Poisson model for estimating the distribution of failures 
given an accident 
l Use computer program to tabulate failure probabilities and aggregate 
economic losses 
l Develop national risk profile based on estimated accident frequency 
Figure i2.- Methodology overview. 
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D = Average Density of Equipment 
S = Surface Integral of Exposure 
E,= Average Outside Exposure to Failure 
E = CF Expkure at Any Location 
For a given equipment type and release condition 
the expected number of failures is: 
No = 
s 




Density ( Fi Since E< <E. 
Area 
For different releaseconditionsbut equivalent amount 
released 
Average No= e 
When average No is small the variation in number of 
failures is predominantly due to the randomness of failure 
events 
Figure 23.- Basis of Poisson approach. 
Growth 
Rate 
CF Mass CF Mass 
No. of Released Released in 
No. of Aircraft Average CF in Total Substantial 
Aircraft Carrying CF Composite per Destruction Damage 
in 1993 in 1993 Aircraft (KG) Accident (KG) Accident (KG) 
Single reciprocating engine 6.3% 32 1,000 80,250 7 .14 .034 
Multi-engine and jets 4.8% 72,500 18,125 20.5 .41 .lO 
Helicopter, non-fixed 
wingand non-powered 8.6% 25,000 6,250 54.5 1.09 .27 
Figure 24.- Estimated usage of carbon fiber and potential releases (1993). 
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l Cruise accidents 
County probabilities are based on weighted average 
of local and itinerant operations 
l On or near airport accidents 
County probabilities are based on number of operations 
l 30% of operations accounted for. Other operations 
allocated to counties within each state according to 
population 
Figure 25.- Distribution of general aviation accidents. 
Frequency 
340 fire accidents per year, of which 85 would involve CF. 
Air taxi and commuter would raise this to 88 
Relative likelihoods of accident types: 
Cruise On or Near Airport 
Total Substantial Total Substantial 
Destruction Damage Destruction Damage 
Non-fixed or .072 .013 .043 .014 
non-powered 
Single .333 .023 .203 .034 
reciprocating 
Multiple or jet .lOl .014 .122 .028 
Figure 26.- General aviation accident data (1993 projections). 



















Figure 27.- General aviation 1993 probability 
distribution of number of equipment fail- 









of Failures for 
Each Combination 
lity Distribution 
for Number of 










Figure 28.- Risk analysis procedure. 
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Dollar losses 
Mean (per accident) : $2.88 
Standard deviation (per accident) $114 
Mean (annual) $253 
Standard deviation (Annual) $1067 
Upper bounds for annual loss 




Figure 29.- Result of risk analysis 1993. 
1 10 100 1000 10,000 700,000 1 Million 10 Million 
Dollar Value D 
Figure 30.- Approximate upper bound on national risk profile 
for general aviation accidents (1993). 
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l Increase in amount released - direct effect on upper 
bound probabilities 
l Increase in equipment vulnerability - direct effect 
on upper bound probabilities 
E.G. 
CF increases by 10 
OI- I! decreases by 10 









Figure 31.- Sensitivity analysis. 
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